[Image by Mohamed Hassan from Pixabay]

One of the points we try to get across here at the Minimise Project is that the abortion debate is actually two debates: one on personhood/equal rights, and one on bodily rights. However, another point that we talk about less frequently is that the abortion is debate is really only these two debates. I have referenced this fact before when dialoguing with pro-life people, but I wanted to flesh it out a bit for our pro-choice readers.

First, a brief reminder: the pro-life position follows, as far as I’m concerned, like this:

  1. It is generally wrong to kill innocent people (there may be exceptions, eg, if an innocent person is threatening the lives of others because they are mentally unwell or because they are the victim of coercion, or in a warzone, etc. We will be coming back to the potential for exceptions quite a bit!)
  2. The unborn are people
  3. A woman’s right to exercise bodily autonomy does not qualify as one of the exceptions to 1

I do recognise, however, that most if not all pro-choice people think this is far too simplistic. I’ve simply laid out three tiny, black and white statements, which take no account of the complexity or nuance of people’s lives and circumstances, of pregnancy, of gender equality, or of the dreadful challenges and choices that people face daily. It’s too naive, it’s too heavy-handed, it’s heartless and cruel, it’s not realistic, it’s wrong, and you have so many examples to illustrate this point. I would like to take this opportunity to very briefly, with very little detail, show why these other valid, necessary arguments, ultimately fit into and are answered by 1-3 above. I’m being deliberately brusque here, and I’m not going to attempt to fully address any of these arguments, I’m just hoping to show how these arguments each ultimately fit into 1-3. I will however revisit and properly respond to these arguments in more detail in the future (if there are any you’d like to hear more about specifically, please let us know!). This post covers three such arguments, and my next post will cover four more – but let us know if you have any other arguments!

You can’t equate a living, breathing woman or girl with an unconscious embryo or foetus

This is a very important and compelling objection, and it is absolutely true. We can’t equate a living, breathing woman or girl with an unconscious embryo or foetus. There are massive differences between them, real, substantive, important differences. The pro-life movement should not deny these differences (perhaps some do, but they shouldn’t). The question, however, is not whether these differences exist – it’s whether they are relevant.

We do not believe they are relevant when it comes to determining whether the unborn should count as people, and we explain why in our Equal Rights Argument. If you agree with the Equal Rights Argument, then perhaps you disagree with point 1 above – that’s it’s generally wrong to kill innocent people – or perhaps you think being unconscious and/or being an embryo or foetus count as exceptions to point 1. That’s totally fair! For the record, we have considered both exceptions, and we disagree – but please let us know if you think we’re wrong!

Some babies die before or shortly after birth and you’re ignoring that fact

The case of babies who will die before or shortly after birth (also known as life limiting conditions or fatal foetal abnormalities) played a huge role in persuading many people to oppose constitutional recognition for unborn life in Ireland. It is clearly important for many people that parents not be forced to carry on with a pregnancy when there is little or no chance there will be a living child at the end of it. 

Unless you think someone who will die soon does not count as a person, then I think these cases do not refute points 2 or 3 above. Therefore, I think again this objection is probably best considered as a case for an extra “exception” to point 1 – you can’t kill innocent people, unless this person will (a) soon die anyway and (b) will cause great suffering to someone else in the meantime. I am OK with having that conversation, and would love it if we could phrase it in those terms! Thus, if you support abortion because of LLC/FFA, I would try asking yourself: do I think parents should have the right to euthanise their babies and toddlers, who are terminally ill but who are experiencing no distress or suffering, in order to reduce the suffering of the parents in the meantime? If your answer is yes (and I genuinely, totally understand why that might be and very much share that instinct on many levels), then fair enough – your justification of abortion in this case takes the form of an exception to point 1 above. If your answer is no, however, then I think you have not actually found a justification for abortion outside of the framework I provided.

Pregnancy can wreak absolute havoc on a woman, or particularly on a girl

Once again, this point does not refute points 2 or 3 above, so let’s go with the “exception” idea again. In this case, we’re saying “It is wrong to kill innocent people unless their life may wreak havoc on someone else”. Again, I totally understand the instinct behind this. However, I think if you really thought about it, you’d see that you’re highly unlikely to apply this principle to any other people. Can you think of any circumstance where you would conclude that an innocent person’s existence wreaking complete and total havoc on someone else would justify their being killed? Or would you conclude that, while the fact that their existence is wreaking complete and total havoc on someone else is an absolute devastating tragedy, and that everything possible should be done to alleviate the situation, killing an innocent person is not an acceptable solution?

I think once you put this in “exception” language, most people would realise that it’s not just the massive impacts that pregnancy can cause on women and girls that explains the instinct for support for abortion. It’s actually because deep down, the person believes that the unborn don’t actually fully count as people (point 2) and/or they believe that the havoc caused by having one’s bodily autonomy violated is a particular kind of havoc that justifies a particular kind of response (point 3).

My next post will attempt to show how another four arguments also ultimately fit into the 1-2-3 framework above – but if you think of any others you’d like me to address, please let us know!

Muireann